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Abstract
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social 
choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with 
Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irreso-
lute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose 
a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute 
social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We 
explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impos-
sibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and 
resoluteness.
1 Introduction
Equal treatment of individuals as well as of alternatives are among the core prin-
ciples of democratic decision-making. Equal treatment of individuals is usually 
ensured by the anonymity condition, which requires the social choice to be invari-
ant under renaming individuals. The typical condition to ensure equal treatment 
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of alternatives, on the other hand, is neutrality, which requires the social choice to 
change in compliance with renaming of alternatives.
The logical incompatibility between anonymity and neutrality while ensuring 
an untied outcome is among the most well-known results in social choice theory. 
Moulin (1980, 1991) characterizes the sizes of social choice problems that admit 
anonymous and neutral social choice rules (SCRs) that are resolute, i.e., that choose 
a unique alternative at any profile. More precisely, a social choice problem with n 
individuals and m alternatives admits an anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCR if 
and only if m cannot be written as the sum of some divisors of n that exceed 1 (Mou-
lin 1991). When (Pareto) efficiency is imposed together with anonymity and neutral-
ity, this requirement is strengthened to “n not having a prime divisor less than or 
equal to m” (Moulin 1980).1
How severe is this tension between anonymity and neutrality? Campbell and 
Kelly (2015) show the rarity of cases where anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCRs 
exist: when the number of individuals is divisible by at least two distinct primes, 
only a finite number of social choice problems admit anonymous, neutral, and 
resolute SCRs. Also, when the number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime 
dividing the number of individuals, a resolute SCR is anonymous and neutral only 
if it chooses alternatives that are in the bottom half of preferences of all individu-
als. Adding efficiency to anonymity and neutrality restricts the sizes of social choice 
problems that admit anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCRs even further.
Do these results leave any hope for guaranteeing equal treatment of voters and 
alternatives for untied collective choice? We reject pessimism by identifying a 
weakening of neutrality which allows a vast range of possibilities while pandering to 
a very significant aspect of equal treatment of alternatives. This new condition that 
we call consequential neutrality requires that all alternatives are chosen at the same 
number of preference profiles.
For example, with an odd number of individuals, fixing two alternatives x and 
y and two individuals i and j, one can define the resolute SCR that picks the best 
alternative of individual i when a majority of individuals prefer x to y and other-
wise, picks the best alternative of individual j. This SCR presents a procedure that 
depends on the names of the alternatives, hence failing neutrality. On the other hand, 
being consequentially neutral, it ensures that every alternative is chosen at the same 
number of preference profiles, thus putting forward an ex-ante fairness property that 
is more outcome-oriented compared to the classical neutrality approach that entails 
a more procedure-oriented equal treatment of alternatives.
Recent research on anonymous and neutral social choice mostly focus on rules 
that assign orderings (instead of alternatives) to preference profiles. Bubboloni and 
Gori (2014) and Doğan and Giritligil (2015) characterize the sizes of social choice 
problems for which anonymous and neutral rules that are resolute, i.e., that assign 
strict social welfare orderings to profiles, exist. Building on the algebraic approach 
in Bubboloni and Gori (2014), Bubboloni and Gori (2015) propose a weakening of 
1 Zwicker (2016) delivers an introduction to the theory of voting where major results regarding anonym-
ity and neutrality are included.
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neutrality by assuming that alternatives are divided into sub-classes and requiring 
equal treatment of alternatives within each sub-class, while alternatives in different 
sub-classes may be differently treated. They provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of (reversal) symmetric majority rules that satisfy this weak-
ening of neutrality together with a weaker version of anonymity.2 Bubboloni and 
Gori (2016) adopt the aforementioned versions of anonymity and neutrality together 
with efficiency and characterize when rules that assign orderings to profiles admit a 
resolute refinement that preserves these properties. Their characterization identifies 
the necessary and sufficient arithmetical conditions on the sizes of sub-committees 
and sub-classes. King and Powers (2018), on the other hand, dispense with neutral-
ity altogether and identify a characterization of rules that satisfy anonymity, mono-
tonicity, and cancellation, in the case of two alternatives.
We start by analyzing the structure of irresoluteness imposed by anonymity, neu-
trality, and efficiency, a previously overlooked matter. We generalize the charac-
terization of Moulin (1980) by completely describing the sizes of unavoidable ties 
under these conditions (Theorem 2). This generalization paves the way to identify-
ing a method to refine SCRs that are “more irresolute than necessary,” while ano-
nymity, efficiency, and neutrality are preserved (Theorem 3).
We then turn to our analysis of consequential neutrality for resolute SCRs. We 
start with counting the number of resolute SCRs that are neutral and those that are 
consequentially neutral (CN) as a function of the size of the social choice problem 
(Theorem 4). An analytical comparison of these two numbers seems beyond reach, 
so we take a computational approach where we compute the numbers of resolute 
SCRs in each class for a small set of values of the size of the social choice problem. 
These numerical exercises that we report on show strong tendencies in the compari-
son of the numbers of CN and neutral SCRs, hence we conjecture that the class of 
resolute SCRs that are CN is considerably larger than those that are neutral.
Thereafter, we discuss the possibility of refining anonymous, efficient, and neu-
tral SCRs by replacing neutrality with consequential neutrality and deliver a pos-
sibility result under certain conditions (Theorem  5). We also identify some cases 
where these conditions are not satisfied but there exist anonymous, CN, and res-
olute SCRs (Theorem  6). These positive results do not hold over all conceivable 
social choice problems: we point to instances where anonymity, consequential neu-
trality, efficiency, and resoluteness turn out to be incompatible (Theorem 7). These 
are instances where the incompatibility prevails even without efficiency. However, 
even in those cases, anonymous, CN, and resolute SCRs exist. In fact, we are able to 
identify a large class of social choice problems, namely those where the number of 
alternatives exceeds the number of individuals, for which anonymity, consequential 
neutrality, and resoluteness are compatible (Theorem 9).
The paper is organized as follows. Section  2 gives basic notation and notions. 
Section  3 delivers a generalization of the classical result on incompatibility of 
2 They propose a weaker version of anonymity in a similar way by assuming that individuals are divided 
into sub-committees and requiring that, within each sub-committee, individuals have equal influence on 
the collective decision, while people in different sub-committees may enjoy different levels of influence.
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anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency with resoluteness and proposes a refinement 
method towards resoluteness. Section 4 introduces consequential neutrality and pre-
sents our more permissive results when it replaces neutrality. Section 5 concludes.
2  Basic notions and notation
Writing ℕ for the set of natural numbers and picking m, n ∈ ℕ⟍{1} , we conceive a 
social choice problem as a set A of alternatives with #A = m and a set N of individu-
als with #N = n . We refer to (m, n) as the size of the social choice problem (A, N). 
Writing L(X) for the set of linear orders, i.e., complete, asymmetric, and transitive 
binary relations on a given set X, let Pi ∈ L(A) denote the preference of i ∈ N.3 An 
n−tuple of such individual preferences indicates a (preference) profile PN ∈ L(A)N . 
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping f ∶ L(A)N → A , where A = 2A⟍{∅} is 
the set of non-empty subsets of A.
Given any two sets S and T, we write S ⊆ T  whenever S is a subset of T and S ⊂ T  
whenever S is a proper subset of T. We let PN|B denote the restriction of PN ∈ L(A)N 
to those alternatives in B ∈ A so that PN|B ∈ L(B)N and xPiy ⟺ xPi|By for 
all x, y ∈ B and i ∈ N . Given any two SCRs f1 and f2 , we say that f2 refines f1 iff 
f2(PN) ⊆ f1(PN) ∀PN ∈ L(A)N and f2(P�N) ⊂ f1(P
�
N
) for some P�
N
∈ L(A)N . An SCR 
f is resolute whenever #f (PN) = 1 ∀PN ∈ L(A)N . For a resolute SCR f, we write 
f (PN) = x in place of f (PN) = {x}.
We now define two equal treatment conditions that are at the core of our analy-
sis. For any non-empty finite set X, a permutation on X is a bijection  ∶ X ↔ X . 
Let ΣX be the set of all permutations on X. We write, by a slight abuse of nota-
tion, (PN) = (P(i))i∈N for the profile obtained from PN ∈ L(A)N by a permutation 
 ∈ ΣN . An SCR is anonymous iff f (PN) = f ((PN)) ∀PN ∈ L(A)N ∀ ∈ ΣN . Again, 
by an abuse of notation, we write (Pi) for the preference obtained from Pi ∈ L(A) 
by a permutation  ∈ ΣA on A, i.e., x Pi y ⟺ (x) (Pi) (y) ∀x, y ∈ A.
Moreover, we set (PN) = ((Pi))i∈N ∀PN ∈ L(A)N . An SCR is neutral iff 
f ((PN)) = (f (PN)) ∀PN ∈ L(A)N , ∀x ∈ A , and ∀ ∈ ΣA.
We close the section by noting that an SCR f is efficient iff given any PN ∈ L(A)N 
and any x ∈ f (PN) , ∄y ∈ A�{x} with y Pi x ∀i ∈ N.
3  Anonymous, neutral, and efficient social choice
Given k, l ∈ ℕ , we write k ∣ l whenever k divides l, i.e., l
k
∈ ℕ , and k ∤ l oth-
erwise. Let D(n) = {k ∈ ℕ ∶ k ∣ n} be the set of divisors of n ∈ ℕ and 
D
∗(n) = {kis a prime ∶ k ∣ n} ∪ {1} be the set consisting of prime divisors of n as 
well as 1. Thus, D∗(n) ⊆ D(n) for all n ∈ ℕ . For any m, n ∈ ℕ , the set of divisors 
of n that do not exceed m is denoted Dm(n) = {d ∈ D(n) ∶ d ≤ m} and similarly 
3 So, given any distinct x, y ∈ A and Pi ∈ L(A) , precisely one of xPiy and yPix holds. Moreover, xPiy 
and yPiz implies xPiz for all x, y, z ∈ A and Pi ∈ L(A) . Finally, xPix does not hold for any x ∈ A.
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(n) = {d inD∗(n) ∶ d ≤ m} . Again, D∗
m




(n) = {1} is shown by Moulin (1980) to be a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the size of a social choice problem to admit an anonymous, neutral, efficient, and 
resolute SCR.
Theorem 1 (Moulin 1980) A social choice problem (A, N) with size (m, n) admits an 





(n) = {1} in Theorem 1 can be replaced by Dm(n) = {1}.4 We 
will refer to Dm(n) = {1} as Condition (m, n).5
Theorem 1 gives a complete picture of the sizes of social choice problems where 
irresoluteness is inevitable but is silent about the structure of irresoluteness in such 
cases. To analyze this, we define Kf = {#f (PN) ∶ PN ∈ L(A)N} as the irresoluteness 
outlook of SCR f. So for any natural number k ≤ m , we have k ∈ Kf  if and only if 
there exists a profile to which f assigns a set of k alternatives.6
Theorem 2 Take any social choice problem (A, N) with size (m, n). 
i.  An SCR f is anonymous, efficient, and neutral only if Kf ⊇ Dm(n).
ii.  There exists an anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR f with Kf = Dm(n).
Proof 
 i. Take d ∈ Dm(n) . As d ∈ D(n) , there exists t ∈ ℕ such that n = dt . Take any 
set of alternatives {x1,… , xd} ⊆ A and the partition {S1,… , Sd} of N with 
S1 = {1,… , t} , S2 = {t + 1,… , 2t} , S3 = {2t + 1,… , 3t} , and so on. Let 
X = A�{x1,… , xd} . Note that X may be empty. Now construct a profile PN as 
depicted below: 
4 Having already noted D∗
m
(n) ⊆ Dm(n) , we now remark that D
∗
m
(n) = {1} ⟹ Dm(n) = {1} for all 
m, n ∈ ℕ . To prove this by contradiction, we first let k ∈ Dm(n)�{1} . Thus, we have k ∈ D(n) and k ≤ m . 
Due to the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, k has a prime divisor k∗ , which divides n as well, hence 
k∗ ∈ D∗
m
(n) , implying D∗
m
(n) ≠ {1}.
5 This condition is equivalent to asking the greatest common divisor of m! and n to be 1, as mentioned 
by Doğan and Giritligil (2015), who reconsider the problem through a group theoretic approach. Interest-
ingly, as Doğan and Giritligil (2015) as well as Bubboloni and Gori (2014) show, gcd(m!, n) = 1 turns 
out to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of anonymous and neutral social welfare functions 
(i.e., functions which assign to every preference profile a strict ranking of alternatives).
6 Note that the irresoluteness outlook of an SCR f does not specify to how many profiles f assigns k 
alternatives when k ∈ Kf .
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 As f is efficient, f (PN) ⊆ {x1,… , xd}. Note that when d = 1 , this implies 
#f (PN) = 1 , hence 1 ∈ Kf  . Now let d > 1 . Consider the permutation  of A 
such that 
 Next, let � ∈ ΣN be such that �(i) = i − t for all i ∈ {t + 1,… , dt = n} 
and �(i) = (d − 1)t + i for all i ∈ {1,… , t} . Note that (PN) = (�)−1(PN) . 
Since f (PN) is a nonempty subset of A, there exists xi ∈ f (PN) for some 
i ∈ {1,… ,m} . By neutrality, xi ∈ f (PN) implies (xi) ∈ f ((PN)) . By ano-
nymity, xi ∈ f (PN) implies xi ∈ f ((PN)) . This is only possible when 
f (PN) = {x1,… , xd} , as xi ∈ f (PN) implies both xi ∈ f ((PN)) and 
xi+1 ∈ f ((PN)) for all i ∈ {1,… , d − 1} and xd ∈ f (PN) implies both 
xd ∈ f ((PN)) and x1 ∈ f ((PN)) . Hence, #f ((PN)) = d , thus d ∈ Kf .
 ii. Let (x,PN) = #
{
i ∈ N ∶ xPiy∀y ∈ A�{x}
}
 denote the number of individuals 
that rank x on top of their preferences in the profile PN . Define the plurality rule 
Υ ∶ L(A)N → A so that 




→ A such 
that 𝜐(PN) ⊆ B for all PN ∈ L(B)N and B ∈ A , which selects the plural-
ity winners after successive restriction of profiles to plurality winners.7 Let 
Υi+1(PN) = Υ(PN|Υi(PN )) for all i ≥ 1 and Υ
1(PN) = Υ(PN) . Define 
 where k is the minimal integer that satisfies Υk(PN) = Υk+1(PN) . Such an 
integer always exists given the finiteness of A. It is easily checked that  is 
anonymous, efficient, and neutral. We will show that K = Dm(n) for all 
n,m ∈ ℕ . By definition, for any x, y ∈ A and any PN ∈ L(A)N , x, y ∈ (PN) 
implies (x,PN|Υk(PN )) = (y,PN|Υk(PN )) = t for some t ∈ ℕ . Furthermore, for 
S1 S2 S3 ⋯ Sd
x1 x2 x3 ⋯ xd
. . . ⋯ x1
. . . ⋯ .
. . . ⋯ .
. . xd ⋯ xd−3
. xd x1 ⋯ xd−2
xd x1 x2 ⋯ xd−1
X X X ⋯ X
𝜎(xi) = xi+1∀i ∈ {1,… , d − 1},
𝜎(xd) = x1, and
𝜎(x̄) = x̄ ∀x̄ ∈ X.
Υ(PN) = {x ∈ A ∶ (x,PN) ≥ (y,PN)∀y ∈ A}.
(PN) = Υ
k(PN),
7 Note that the iterative plurality rule presents a generalization of our concept of an SCR in the sense 
that it is defined on the domain of preference profiles over every B ∈ A.
1 3
Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited 
any z ∉ (PN) , (z,PN|Υk(PN )) = 0 . Thus, we have (#(PN))t = n , implying 
K𝜐 ⊆ D(n) . As #(PN) ≤ m , in fact, K𝜐 ⊆ Dm(n) . Given part i of the theorem, 
we have K = Dm(n).
  ◻
Theorem 2 generalizes Theorem 1, which now comes as a corollary; when Condi-
tion (m, n) fails, by Theorem 2.i, every anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR has 
#f (PN) > 1 for some PN ∈ L(A)N and when Condition (m, n) is satisfied, the itera-
tive plurality rule  ensures the existence of an anonymous, efficient, and neutral f 
with #f (PN) = 1 for all PN ∈ L(A)N.8
As a matter of fact, Theorem  2 establishes that the irresoluteness outlook K 
of the iterative plurality rule is the best that an anonymous, efficient, and neutral 
SCR can achieve. To be sure, this does not mean that  cannot be refined while 
preserving anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. But surely, any anonymous, effi-
cient, and neutral refinement of  will have the same irresoluteness outlook as 
 itself. Moreover, as we formally state in the next theorem, any anonymous, effi-
cient, and neutral SCR whose irresoluteness outlook is a proper superset of K 
can be refined while anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are preserved. Before, 
we define, for any SCR f ∶ L(A)N → A , the composite rule f ∶ L(A)N → A by 
f (PN) = (PN|f (PN ))∀PN ∈ L(A)
N.
Theorem  3 Given a social choice problem (A,  N), an anonymous, efficient, and 
neutral SCR f with Kf ⊃ K𝜐 admits the anonymous, efficient, and neutral refinement 
f ∶ L(A)N → A with Kf = K.
Proof Take any social choice problem (A, N) and any anonymous, efficient, and neu-
tral f with Kf ⊃ K𝜐 . By definition of f  , we have 𝜐f (PN) ⊆ f (PN) for all PN ∈ L(A)N . 
Take any P�
N
∈ L(A)N . First, let #f (P�
N
) ∈ K . As K = Dm(n) by Theorem 2, we have 
#f (P�
N
) ∈ Dm(n) which implies #f (P�N) ∈ K as well. Now, let #f (P
�
N
) ∈ Kf⧵K . 
As #f (P�
N
) ∈ D(n) by definition of  , we cannot have f (P�
N
) = f (P�
N
) . Thus, 
𝜐f (P�
N
) ⊂ f (P�
N
) . Furthermore, as #f (P�
N
) ≤ m , we have #f (P�
N
) ∈ Dm(n) = K . 
Noting that f  is anonymous, efficient, and neutral concludes the proof.   ◻
As an instance of Theorem 3, consider the social choice problem A = {x, y, z} , 
N = {1, 2} , and PN ∈ L(A)N with xP1yP1z and zP2yP2x . For the Borda rule  , which 
chooses the alternatives that have the minimal sum of ranks over individuals, we 
have (PN) = {x, y, z} , thus 3 ∈ K , while one can check that K = {1, 2} , and, 
indeed, the composite rule  , which gives 𝜐𝛽(PN) = {x, z} ⊂ 𝛽(PN) , refines  and is 
anonymous, efficient, and neutral.
Theorem 3 points to the possibility of shrinking the irresoluteness outlook of an 
anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR f down to K by composing f with  , while 
f  preserves all three properties. However, this does not mean that f  can refine f at 
8 Part (ii) of Theorem 2 can be proven with rules other than the iterative plurality rule, such as Coombs 
rule, as in Moulin (1983) p. 24. We are thankful to a referee for pointing out this fact.
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every PN ∈ L(A)N with f (PN) ⊃ 𝜐(PN) . To see this, let m = 5 and n = 6 , and con-
sider the following profile PN.
We have (PN) = {x, y} and (PN) = {x, y, z} , where  denotes the fallback bar-
gaining rule.9 However, the composite rule  does not refine  at this profile, i.e., 
(PN) = {x, y, z}.
4  Consequential neutrality
Let Wf (S) = {PN ∈ L(A)N ∶ f (PN) = S} for any S ∈ A be the set of profiles to which 
an SCR f assigns S. We write Wf (x) in place of Wf ({x}) in case of singletons. Define 
an SCR f ∶ L(A)N → A to be consequentially neutral (CN) iff #Wf (S) = #Wf (S�) 
for all S, S� ∈ A with #S = #S� . Thus, when f is resolute, CN requires that any two 
alternatives are assigned to the same number of profiles.
Proposition 1 An SCR f is neutral only if f is CN.





} for some h ∈ {1,… ,m} . Take any PN ∈ Wf (S) . Thus, we have 
f (PN) = S . Take any  ∶ A ↔ A such that (xi) = x�i for all i ∈ {1,… , h} . By neu-
trality, PN ∈ Wf (S) implies f ((PN)) = S� , or (PN) ∈ Wf (S�) . Thus, we have 
#Wf (S) ≤ #Wf (S
�) . As #Wf (S�) ≤ #Wf (S) holds as well, the proof is completed.   ◻
Now, we focus on resolute SCRs. Given m, n ∈ ℕ�{1} with #A = m and 
N = {1,… , n} , we write FCN
m,n
 for the set of resolute SCRs that are CN; FNEUTRAL
m,n
 
for the set of resolute and neutral SCRs; and FRESOLUTE
m,n
 for the set of resolute SCRs.




 for all m, n ∈ ℕ�{1} . The 
inclusion is indeed strict. To see this, fix a profile P̄N ∈ L(A)N . Take the per-
mutation  ∈ ΣA such that (x1) = x2 , (x2) = x1 , and if m ≥ 3 , let (xj) = xj 
for all j ∈ {3,… ,m} . Take any partition P = {P1,… ,Pm} of L(A)N such that 
#Pi = #Pj for all i, j ∈ {1,… ,m} and P̄N , 𝜎(P̄N) ∈ P1 . Define f ∶ L(A)N → A 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
x x t r y y
y y z z x x
z z x y r z
r t y x z t
t r r t t r
9 Define, for any PN ∈ L(A)N , (PN , x, k) = #{i ∈ N ∶ #{y ∈ A�{x} ∶ xPiy} ≥ k} , which gives the num-
ber of individuals that rank x higher than at least k alternatives. Now, define the fallback bargaining rule 
 ∶ L(A)N → A so that, ∀x ∈ A , x ∈ (PN ) iff
for all y ∈ A�{x}.
*maxk∈{0,…,m−1}
{




k ∈ ℕ ∶ (PN , y, k) = n
}
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such that f (PN) = xi for all PN ∈ Pi and i ∈ {1,… ,m} . By construction, 
#{PN ∈ L(A)
N ∶ f (PN) = xi} = #{PN ∈ L(A)
N ∶ f (PN) = xj} for all i, j ∈ {1,… ,m} , 
hence f is CN. However, it fails neutrality as f (P̄N) = x1 = f (𝜎(P̄N)).
This raises the following two issues: How large is FCN
m,n
 compared to FNEUTRAL
m,n
 and 
which interesting resolute SCRs, if any, does it contain? We address the first ques-
tion through a counting approach.10














Proof i.  This is straightforward, as we noted before that #L(A)N = m!n.
ii.  We say that P′
N
 is a renaming (for alternatives) of PN iff there exists 





 is a renaming of 
PN . Noting that 𝜌 ⊆ L(A)N × L(A)N is an equivalence relation, we write E 
for the partition of L(A)N provided by . Note that each profile PN admits 
m! renamings and that #L(A)N = m!n . Thus, E admits m!n−1 equivalence 
classes, each of which contains m! profiles. We write E = {Ei}i∈{1,…,m!n−1} 
with #Ei = m! for all i ∈ {1,… ,m!n−1}. Take any Et ∈ E and pick any 
PN ∈ Et . Let f (PN) = x for some x ∈ A . Neutrality, together with the defi-
nition of Et , determines f (P�N) for all P
�
N
∈ Et⧵{PN} . As there are m alter-
natives that can be assigned to PN by f, there are m neutral and resolute 
ways an SCR can be defined for the profiles in Et . As t ∈ {1,… ,m!n−1} , 
there are m(m!n−1) neutral and resolute SCRs altogether.
iii.  First observe that, given any two natural numbers p and q, there are (pq)!
q!p
 
ways to partition a set of cardinality pq into p sets, each with cardinality 
q. Hence, there are (m!
n)!
(m!n−1(m−1)!)!m
 ways to partition L(A)N with cardinality 
m!n into m sets, each with cardinality m!n∕m = m!n−1(m − 1)! . For each of 
these ways, m! distinct resolute SCRs can be defined. As a result, 
(m!n)!
(m!n−1(m−1)!)!m
m! resolute SCRs that satisfy consequential neutrality can be 
constructed.
  ◻








)m!n . As 1
m!
< 1 for all 
m > 1 , this ratio approaches to 0 as m → ∞ or n → ∞ . Thus, we conclude that the 
10 Perry and Powers (2008) propose a method to count, in the case of two alternatives, the number of 
aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality. Bubboloni and Gori (2016) give a method to per-
form these counts for any number of alternatives.
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ratio of the number of neutral and resolute SCRs to the number of all resolute SCRs 
is negligible in the limit. Although we do not have analytical solutions for the com-
parisons regarding consequential neutrality, we obtained some numerical observa-
tions through computations for small values of m and n that are provided in Appen-










 converge to 0, as m or n 
increases. Thus, although consequential neutrality and neutrality are both hard to 
satisfy, neutrality seems to be considerably more demanding compared to conse-
quential neutrality.11




 contains interesting SCRs and the 
answer is affirmative, at least for certain sizes of the social choice problem.





 for all k ∈ Dm(n) . This 
condition ensures the existence of anonymous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCRs, as 
shown in Theorem 5 below.
Theorem 5 Let (A, N) be a social choice problem with size (m, n) where Condition 
(m, n) is satisfied. Every anonymous, efficient, irresolute, and neutral SCR f admits 
a resolute refinement which is anonymous, CN, and efficient.
Proof Fix m, n ∈ ℕ as such, let A = {x1,… , xm} , and take any anonymous, efficient, 
and neutral f ∶ L(A)N → A . Clearly, #f (PN) ∈ Dm(n) for all PN ∈ L(A)N due to 






= 1 . Thus, there does not exist a profile PN with f (PN) = A . For 
any k ∈ Dm(n)�{1} , denote with Ak the subsets of A with precisely k elements, that 


















∕k ( = t from now on) is a natural number. We 
want to show that each xi ∈ A can be assigned to t distinct sets of cardinality k that 
contains xi . This will suffice to prove the theorem, given Proposition 1, as the num-
ber of profiles these k−sets are assigned to under a neutral SCR are equal. To do 
that, we introduce the following iterative approach.
First, define  ∶ A ↔ A such that (xi) = xi+1 for all i ∈ {1,… ,m − 1} and 
(xm) = x1 . Next, let ≻Ak denote the lexicographic order of the k−sets in Ak according to 
the order x1 ≻ ⋯ ≻ xm . Thus, for instance, {x1,… , xk} ≻Ak {x1,… , xk−1, xk+1} ≻Ak S 
for all S ∈ Ak⧵{{x1,… , xk}, {x1,… , xk−1, xk+1}}.
11 We are providing computational results for only some small values of m and n because as m and n 
increase, these values grow dramatically (see Tables  2 and 3 in the Appendix). As diminution in the 
ratios are also fast, these values appear to be sufficient for this conclusion. Since the aim of this counting 
exercise is to assess the comparison of numbers of functions that satisfy the two versions of neutrality, 
we leave out other axioms (such as anonymity and efficiency), although it certainly is an interesting ques-
tion.
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Step 1.
– Take the first set in Ak according to ≻Ak , i.e., {x1,… , xk}, and denote this set 
with Ak,1 . Now, denote with r(Ak,1) , the r−time application of permutation  , 
with a slight abuse of notation. Thus, for instance, 1(Ak,1) = {x2,… , xk+1} . 
Denote with Ak,1 the set comprising of Ak,1 together with m − 1 other k−sets in 
Ak that are constructed from Ak,1 by applying  iteratively m − 1 times. Thus, 




– Take the first set in Ak⧵Ak,1 according to ≻Ak and denote this set with Ak,2 . Con-
struct Ak,2 as in Step 1 so that Ak,2 = {Ak,2, 1(Ak,2),… , m−1(Ak,2)}.
Step j for j ∈ {3,… , t} if t > 2.
– Take the first set in Ak⧵
⋃j−1
c=1
Ak,c according to ≻Ak and denote this set with Ak,j . 
Construct Ak,j as in Step 1.
The proof concludes by constructing an SCR g that refines f  such that for all 
PN ∈ L(A)
N , k ∈ Dm(n)⧵{1} , and j ∈ {1,… , t},
• f (PN) = Ak,j ⟹ g(PN) = x1 and
• f (PN) = r(Ak,j) ⟹ g(PN) = xr+1 ∀r ∈ {1,… ,m − 1}.
We need to make sure that the following hold. 
 (i) x1 ∈ Ak,j for all j ∈ {1,… , t}.
 (ii) xr+1 ∈ r(Ak,j) for all j ∈ {1,… , t} and for all r ∈ {1,… ,m − 1}.
 (iii) {Ak,j}j∈{1,…,t} is a partition of Ak.
 (i) First, note that x1 ∈ Ak,1 . Next, observe that #{S ∈ Ak,1 ∶ x1 ∈ S} = k 
as #Ak,1 = k , x1 ∈ Ak,1 , and for each xj ∈ Ak,1⧵{x1} , there exists a unique 
r ∈ {1,… ,m − 1} such that r(xj) = x1 . Thus, in fact, for all j ∈ {2,… , t} , ⋃j−1
c=1








Ak,c according to ≻Ak is chosen to be Ak,j , x1 ∈ Ak,j for all 
j ∈ {1,… , t} is established.
 (ii) As x1 ∈ Ak,j for all j ∈ {1,… , t} and r(x1) = xr+1 , it is straightforward to note 
that xr+1 ∈ r(Ak,j) for all j ∈ {1,… , t} and for all r ∈ {1,… ,m − 1}.
12 This holds for any xi ∈ A.
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 (iii) First, note that #Ak,i = m for all i ∈ {1,… , t} . We need to show that 




Ak,c for all j ∈ {1,… , t} . To see that, suppose for a contradic-
tion that there exists S ∈ Ak,i ∩Ak,j for some i, j ∈ {1,… , t} with j > i . We 
must have S = ri(Ak,i) = rj(Ak,j) for some ri, rj ∈ {1,… ,m − 1} . Note that 
ri ≠ rj as Ak,i ≠ Ak,j . In case ri > rj , we have ri−rj (Ak,i) = Ak,j and in case ri < rj , 




We let g(PN) = f (PN) for all PN ∈ L(A)N with #f (PN) = 1 . g is a resolute refine-
ment of f. Naturally, g is anonymous as f is. Furthermore, by construction of the 
iterative process above, g is also CN. Finally, as f is efficient, g is efficient as well.  
 ◻
To see how the refinement in Theorem 5 can be constructed, consider the follow-
ing example with A = {x1,… , x7} and n = 5 . Take any f that is anonymous, effi-
cient, and neutral. We have D7(5) = {1, 5} , so we focus on k = 5 for the iterative 





= 21 and t = 3 , that is, there are 21 distinct sets with 5 alter-
natives and all profiles that result in 5 alternatives under f  should be assigned to 
each of the 7 alternatives so that each will be chosen within 3 different sets. So in 
Step 1, we set A5,1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} and construct A5,1 . In Step 2, we set 
A5,2 = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x6} which follows {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} in the lexicographic order 
≻A5 and construct A5,2 . In Step 3, final step, we cannot set the next set according to 
≻A5 , i.e., {x1, x2, x3, x4, x7} , as A5,3 because it already appears in A5,1 as 
6(A5,1) = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x7} . However, we can set {x1, x2, x3, x5, x6} as A5,3 , which 
follows {x1, x2, x3, x4, x7} in the lexicographic order ≻A5 and construct A5,3 to com-
plete the iterative process as depicted in the Table 1.
The refinement g is constructed so that for all PN ∈ L(A)N and for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
 (i) f (PN) ∈ A5,j implies g(PN) = x1 and
 (ii) f (PN) ∈ r(A5,j) implies g(PN) = xr+1 for all r ∈ {1,… , 6}.
13 Note that r+m(xi) = r(xi) for all r ∈ ℕ and i ∈ {1,… ,m}.
Table 1  Iterative process for 
constructing the partitioning 







j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
A5,j {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} {x1, x2, x3, x4, x6} {x1, x2, x3, x5, x6}
(A5,j) {x2, x3, x4, x5, x6} {x2, x3, x4, x5, x7} {x2, x3, x4, x6, x7}
2(A5,j) {x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} {x3, x4, x5, x6, x1} {x3, x4, x5, x7, x1}
3(A5,j) {x4, x5, x6, x7, x1} {x4, x5, x6, x7, x2} {x4, x5, x6, x1, x2}
4(A5,j) {x5, x6, x7, x1, x2} {x5, x6, x7, x1, x3} {x5, x6, x7, x2, x3}
5(A5,j) {x6, x7, x1, x2, x3} {x6, x7, x1, x2, x4} {x6, x7, x1, x3, x4}
6(A5,j) {x7, x1, x2, x3, x4} {x7, x1, x2, x3, x5} {x7, x1, x2, x4, x5}
A5,1 A5,2 A5,3
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Note that Condition (m, n) ensures the existence of anonymous, CN, efficient, and 





 to hold for every k ∈ Dm(n) . On the other hand, 






 to hold for some k ∈ Dm(n) , although does not ensure resoluteness, 
allows the existence of anonymous and efficient refinements that satisfy CN. We 
state this formally in the following remark and leave out its proof as it follows from 






 for some k ∈ Dm(n).
Remark 1 Let (A, N) be a social choice problem with size (m, n) where Condition 
 �(m, n) is satisfied. Every anonymous, efficient, and neutral SCR f admits a refine-
ment which is anonymous, efficient, and CN.
How restrictive is Condition (m, n) ? Note that when m is a prime, Condition 
(m, n) is satisfied.14 Thus, anonymous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCRs exist when 
m is prime and does not divide n. Campbell and Kelly (2015) show that when n 
has at least two distinct prime factors, there can only be finitely many values of m 
for which there are anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCRs. Our result implies, for 
instance, that for such n, there are infinitely many values of m (such as all primes 
that are greater than n) for which there are anonymous, CN, and resolute SCRs. Fur-
thermore, these SCRs can be efficient.
To expand the picture drawn by Theorem 5, we show that Condition (m, n) is not 
necessary for the existence of anonymous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCRs. As a 
matter of fact, the theorem below spans some instances where Condition (m, n) 






Theorem 6 Any social choice problem (A, N) with m ≥ 4 and n ∈ {2, 3} admits an 
anonymous, CN, efficient, and resolute SCR.
Proof Let m ≥ 4 and N = {1, 2} . For any x, y ∈ A , let Txy ⊂ L(A)N denote the set of 
profiles where individual 1 ranks x first and individual 2 ranks y first. Hence {Txy}x≠y 
partitions the set of profiles where there is no unanimously top ranked alternative. 
Given any x, y ∈ A , note that
and hence, #Txy = #Tyx . Now, let A = {x1,… , xm} and define for any distinct 
i, j ∈ {1,… ,m},
Tyx = {(Q,P) ∈ L⇐A⇒
N ∶ (P,Q) ∈ Txy},
Dm(i, j) =
{
k, l ∈ {1,… ,m}�{i, j} ∶ k < l < t∀t ∈ {1,… ,m}�{i, j, k, l}
}
,







 is divisible by m whereas none of {2,… , k} 
divides m.
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as the doubleton that contains the lowest two indices in A excluding i and j. Let 
g ∶ L(A)N → A be a resolute SCR that assigns to any profile the alternative that is 
ranked first by both individuals, if exists. Note that 
#{PN ∈ L(A)
N ∶ xPiz∀z ∈ A∀i ∈ N} = #{PN ∈ L(A)
N ∶ yPiz∀z ∈ A∀i ∈ N} for all 
x, y ∈ A . Furthermore, for all PN ∈ Txixj with i < j and Dm(i, j) = {k, l} , let g(PN) = xi 
when xkP1xl ⟺ xkP2xl and g(PN) = xj otherwise. Hence, we have 
#{PN ∈ Txixj ∶ g(PN) = xi} = #{PN ∈ Txixj ∶ g(PN) = xj} for all xi, xj ∈ A such that 
i < j . Furthermore, let g(P,Q) = g(Q,P) ∀(P,Q) ∈ L(A)N . By construction, g is CN 
and anonymous. Moreover, as g picks an alternative only if it is ranked first by an 
individual, it is also efficient.
Now let N = {1, 2, 3} , hence n = 3 . Let T ⊂ L(A)N denote the subset of profiles 
where each individual has a distinct alternative as most preferred. That is, PN ∈ T  
iff x1P1y for all y ∈ A�{x1} , x2P2y for all y ∈ A�{x2} , and x3P3y for all y ∈ A�{x3} 
implies x1 , x2 , and x3 are all distinct. Note that under the plurality rule Υ , #Υ(PN) = 1 
for all PN ∈ L(A)N�T  and #Υ(PN) = 3 for all PN ∈ T .
Let A = {x1,… , xm} . For any q, r, t ∈ {1,… ,m} with q < r < t , let M({q, r, t}) 
denote the minimal element in {1,… ,m}⧵{q, r, t} . So for instance, when m = 5 , 
M({2, 3, 4}) = 1 and M({1, 2, 4}) = 3 . Let T{xq,xr ,xt} ⊂ T  denote the set of profiles 
where each of xq , xr , and xt appears on top. We now define an SCR h. We let 
h(PN) = Υ(PN) for all PN ∈ L(A)N�T  . For any PN ∈ T{xq,xr ,xt} , let j ∈ N denote the 
individual such that xqPjxw for all w ∈ {1,… ,m}⧵{q} . We let h(PN) = xq if 
xM({q,r,t})Pjxz for all z ∈ {r, t} , h(PN) = xr if xzPjxM({q,r,t}) for all z ∈ {r, t} , and 
h(PN) = xt if either xrPjxM({q,r,t})Pjxt or xtPjxM({q,r,t})Pjxr.
Note that h is resolute by construction and is efficient as it refines the plurality 
rule. Moreover, it is anonymous, as h(PN) = h(P�N) whenever P
′
N
 is anonymously 
equivalent to PN . Since we have
h is also CN.   ◻
At this stage, one may be tempted to ask whether one can find an anonymous, 
CN, efficient, and resolute SCR at any (m, n). The following theorem advises cau-
tion on this.
Theorem 7 There exists a social choice problem which admits no anonymous, CN, 
efficient, and resolute SCR.







#{PN ∈ T{xq,xr ,xt}|xM({q,r,t})Pjxz∀z ∈ {r, t}}
= #{PN ∈ T{xq,xr ,xt}|xzPjxM({q,r,t})∀z ∈ {r, t}}
= #{PN ∈ T{xq,xr ,xt}|xrPjxM({q,r,t})Pjxt or xtPjxM({t,q,r})Pjxr},
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Efficiency implies choosing x at PN and y at P′N . Moreover, f (P
��
N
) = f (P���
N
) by ano-
nymity. Hence, #{PN ∈ L(A)N ∶ f (PN) = x} ≠ #{PN ∈ L(A)N ∶ f (PN) = y} , a fail-
ure of consequential neutrality.   ◻
Nevertheless, the social choice problem in the proof of Theorem  7 admits an 
anonymous, CN, and resolute SCR.15 This raises the question of how general is the 
compatibility between anonymity and consequential neutrality when we dispense 
with the efficiency condition.
Moulin (1991) introduces the following condition that we call (m, n) . Let 
D(n)�{1} = {d1,… , dK} for some K ∈ ℕ.




Remark 2 (m, n) ⟹ (m, n) for all n,m ≥ 2.
The following theorem states the cases of incompatibility of anonymity and neu-
trality in resolute social choice.
Theorem 8 (Moulin 1991) There exists an anonymous, neutral, and resolute SCR if 
and only if (m, n) holds.
We are now ready to state and prove our final theorem, which shows that if m > n , 
there exist anonymous, CN, and resolute SCRs for any social choice problem with 
size (m, n).
Theorem 9 For all social choice problems with n < m , there exists an anonymous, 
CN, and resolute SCR.
Proof Given any preference profile, we observe k distinct preferences for some 





 ways to choose k preferences from L(A) . 
Let  = {p1,… , pk} be a set of k distinct preferences. Write Vk for the set of vectors 
v = (v1,… , vk) with vi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ {1,… , k} and 
∑k
i=1
vi = n . Each v ∈ Vk , com-
bined with  , induces a set of profiles E
v
 that consists of all profiles where pi 





 . Three remarks are in 
order. First, #E depends on k and not on the preferences in  . Second, an SCR f that 
satisfies at any given k ∈ {1,… , min{m!, n}} and  the invariance f (PN) = f (P�N) 
for all PN ,P�N ∈ E
































) = y , which is 
both anonymous and CN while not efficient.
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∕m . Write A = {x1,… , xm} and at each 
k ∈ {1,… , min{m!, n}} assign to every xi tk distinct sets  = {p1,… , pk} and let 
f (PN) = xi for all PN ∈ E at every  assigned to xi for all i ∈ {1,… ,m} . By the 
three remarks, f is anonymous, CN, and resolute.   ◻
5  Conclusion
Using an irresolute SCR, one cannot reach a collective choice without referring to 
an additional mechanism that is external to the SCR. Therefore, Theorems 1 and 8 
reflect the impossibility of making a collective choice by being confined to anony-
mous and neutral (efficient) SCRs as collective choice procedures. We take two dif-
ferent but related approaches to address how severe this impossibility is.
First, we identify the minimal irresoluteness outlook that would arise when ano-
nymity, efficiency, and neutrality make ties inevitable. Based on this analysis, we 
deliver a method which, while preserving anonymity, efficiency, and neutrality, 
refines SCRs that deliver more ties than necessary.
Next, we introduce consequential neutrality as a weakening of neutrality. As 
expected, we obtain results that are more permissive than the (im-)possibilities 
announced by Theorems 1 and 8. We identify a large class of social choice problems 
where resoluteness becomes possible just because consequential neutrality replaces 
neutrality. Nevertheless, when efficiency is preserved, we know that this possibility 
does not hold for every social choice problem.
Dispensing with efficiency presents a case of interest. We show that anonymous, 
CN, and resolute social choice is possible when m > n . Although this condition is 
logically independent of the necessary and sufficient condition of Theorem  8, it 
opens the door of resoluteness to a large class of social choice problems that are 
doomed to irresoluteness by Theorem 8. Moreover, we are not able to find any social 
choice problem where anonymity, consequential neutrality, and resoluteness are 
incompatible. This provokes to ask whether these three conditions are compatible 
for any size of the social choice problem, which we leave as a—combinatorically 
difficult—open question.
Appendix: Observations on the numbers of CN, neutral, and resolute 
SCRs
Tables 2 and 3 below show ratios the observations made in Sect. 4 are based on. 
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 for different 
values of (m, n)






n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
m = 2 0.333333 0.114286 0.00994561
m = 3 3.58965 × 10−14 5.73212 × 10−85 
m = 4   




 for different values of (m, n)






n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
m = 2 0.75 0.546875 0.392761 0.2799
m = 3 0.135304 0.0229012 0.0038267 0.000638057
m = 4 0.00175989 0.0000149993 1.27583 × 10−7 1.08512 × 10−9
m = 5 8.19334 × 10−7 5.69061 × 10−11 3.95181 × 10−15 
m = 6 8.12216 × 10−12   
